

DOG HEAD FIRE REPORT

CIBOLA NATIONAL FOREST AND NATIONAL GRASSLANDS

Southwestern Region – Albuquerque, New Mexico

October 13, 2016



Figure 1 - View of Dog Head Fire from the Estancia School, Estancia, NM



Forest Service Southwestern Region

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Introduction

This document presents the findings from the report of investigation on the cause and origin of the Dog Head Fire, significant events associated with the response, status of rehabilitation and recovery efforts, and key lessons learned for future management. The timeline summarizes events during the initial attack period starting from when the fire was reported on June 14, 2016 through June 25, 2016 when the local Type 3 resumed command of the fire. The fire was declared contained on July 13, controlled on August 10, and out on September 12. This report summarizes the following topics:

- Executive Summary
- Origin and Cause of Fire
- Response to the Fire
- Rehabilitation Efforts
- Lessons Learned and Adaptive Management

Executive Summary

The 17,912 acre Dog Head Fire on Cibola National Forest and National Grasslands (Cibola), Mountainair Ranger District, started on June 14 and was reported at approximately 1130 by both the Pueblo of Isleta and the Capilla Peak Lookout.

The investigation conducted by USFS Law Enforcement and Investigations personnel determined that the fire was human-caused and originated from a masticator, a machine that shreds brush and trees into mulch to reduce forest fuels. The project area contained logging slash and the fire was likely caused when the masticator hit a rock, causing a spark in the fuels. The investigators found no evidence of smoking, lightning, campfires, debris burning, fireworks or other incendiary devices. Based on weather, fuel moistures, and other factors, fire restrictions were not warranted at the time of the incident.

The work was being done on National Forest System lands by a Pueblo of Isleta crew under an agreement as part of the Joint Chiefs Project between USFS and NRCS. The Isleta Collaborative Landscape Restoration Project was designed to reduce the threat of wildfires on the Cibola, Pueblo of Isleta, and the Chilili Land Grant. Other project partners include Manzano and Tajique land grants; the Edgewood, Claunch-Pinto, and East Torrance Soil and Water Conservation Districts; The Nature Conservancy; Rio Grande Water Fund; the Bureau of Indian Affairs; New Mexico Forest Industries Association; private businesses; grazing permittees; and a host of private landowners.

The Forest Service, New Mexico State Forestry, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Bureau of Land Management shared command of the fire and used a full suppression strategy. Ground resources were dispatched and on scene within the first hour. Air resources were used to establish a safe anchor point including a Very Large Air Tanker (VLAT), two Large Air Tankers, and six Single Engine Air Tankers (SEAT). A total of 107,147 gallons of retardant were delivered by the end of the day. Retardant was completely around the fire and crews worked through the night to complete the containment line. Due to increasing complexity, a Type 2 Team was ordered to arrive the next day.

Mid-morning on Day Two, a spot fire was observed 1.5 miles ahead of the main fire. Aerial and ground resources were diverted but fire intensity increased rapidly. The spot fire was quickly engulfed by the main fire. Evacuations were ordered. The fire made a six-mile run that night, burning 12 residences and 44 other structures in and near the community of Chilili. A Type 1 Team was ordered and assumed command of the incident on June 19. Fire behavior moderated, which allowed crews to engage more

fully in the suppression effort. The fire remained at 17,912 acres on June 25 when command was returned to the local unit. The fire was declared out on September 12th at a cost of +\$10M.

A cooperating agency team, originally established for the Forest Plan Revision, prepared for this type of event. Throughout the suppression, rehabilitation, and restoration efforts, the team has remained actively engaged. Numerous community meetings were held and attended by the Governor of New Mexico. A Burned Area Emergency Response included road repairs, culvert clean outs, and rehab of archeological sites. Storm patrols, installation of warning signs, and invasive species surveys are ongoing. The total cost is \$210,589. Boundary surveys, fence replacement, and restoration of grazing allotments are being assessed. NRCS, SWCDS, Farm Services Agency, New Mexico Department of Homeland Security, Torrance and Bernalillo counties, and the Pueblo of Isleta are providing alarms, flood control, well testing, home site clean-up, and other landowner assistance activities. Total costs for rehabilitation efforts have not been determined.

Origin and Cause of the Fire

Preliminary findings indicated that the fire was started by a masticator, a machine that shreds brush and trees into small pieces and scatters them to reduce hazardous fuels. The full investigation on the cause and origin of the fire found that the probable cause of the fire was due to the masticator striking a rock during operations.

The operations were occurring in the Isleta Collaborative Landscape Restoration Project. The project area contained logging slash that was being shredded by the masticator. There were rocks in the area that were covered by the slash. Rocks with scrape marks were located during a grid search of the origin area.

On the morning of June 14th, a three-person thinning crew was using the masticator to shred logging slash into small pieces in an effort to reduce the fire threat to the Cibola, Pueblo of Isleta, and the Chilili Land Grant. The operator was working along a ridgetop when he backed up, adjusted the equipment, turned around and first observed the fire. It was about 4x4 feet wide and burning with three-foot flame lengths in heavy slash. These events occurred within approximately three minutes.

He reported the fire to his supervisor but did not attempt to fight it because it was not safe to do so. The fire was very active. He drove the masticator to the nearby service truck but by this time the fire was crowning into the canopy. The crew moved the equipment further down the hill to a safer location. By that time, the fire was quickly advancing through the understory and crowning into the canopy.

The crew had the equipment required by the agreement which included one shovel, one axe, and one fully charged fire extinguisher. The fire extinguisher was on the masticator and the remaining tools were in the service truck. The truck also had a 5 gallon backpack pump, and additional fire tools. Even though they had the tools, the crew did not directly engage the fire because it was too intense; they waited for additional resources.

Fire restrictions were not warranted at the time of the incident based on current and expected weather conditions, fuel moisture levels, and other factors such as recent fire activity. The Forest used the process outlined in the Southwest Interagency Fire Restrictions and Closure Master Operating Plan and the Cibola NF and NG Fire Danger Operating Plan to make these determinations.

On June 14, 2016 the Mountainair weather station (NWS 29150, elevation 6,500 feet, and located approximately 20 miles southeast of the fire) recorded the 1100 hours weather condition as follows: temperatures: 77 degrees, Relative Humidity: 11 percent; Wind: SW at 10 mph with gusts to 24 mph. The 1200 hours weather conditions were: Temperature: 78 degrees; relative humidity: 10 percent; Winds: West at 8 mph with gusts to 21 mph.

The Oak Flats weather station (NWS 291402, elevation 7,550 feet, and located approximately 13 miles north of the fire) recorded the 1100 hours weather conditions as follows: Temperature 73 degrees; Relative Humidity: 12 percent; Wind: Southwest at 7 mph with gusts to 15 mph. The 1200 hours weather conditions were recorded as follows: Temperature: 75 degrees, Relative Humidity: 11 percent; winds; NW at 6 mph with gust to 15 mph.

Response to the Fire

The Dog Head Fire was first reported to the Mountainair Ranger District office of the Cibola National Forest and National Grasslands (Cibola) on June 14, 2016 at 1124 by a Pueblo of Isleta employee. A few minutes later, at 1130 the Capilla Lookout notified the Albuquerque Interagency Dispatch Center (ABC); and reported that the location was five miles east of the Fourth of July Campground/Spring area on the Mountainair Ranger District. Shortly thereafter the Pueblo of Isleta employee radioed ABC that they were on scene and provided coordinates of the fire.

Within minutes of the report, ABC dispatched Cibola Battalion Chief (BC34), two Type 6 Engines (local engine from Mountainair and prepositioned engine from Helena, MT), and an Air Attack Platform. The Pueblo of Isleta employees on site were instructed by the Mountainair District Duty Officer to take action on the fire. In less than 10 minutes of the initial report, Capilla Lookout reported that the fire had doubled in size and the color of the smoke was changing to dark black. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Southern Pueblo Agency (SPA) advised ABC that the fire is approximately ¼ mile from the Pueblo of Isleta and sent two engines. ABC ordered a Type 1 Helicopter that was based less than an hour from the fire in Socorro, NM, and also ordered a Type 3 Call When Needed (CWN) Helicopter.

Once on scene (approximately at 1212-1217 hours), Air Attack estimated the fire to be 2-3 acres in size and exhibiting very intense burning conditions in red/brown slash. In consultation with BC34, who had yet to arrive on scene, Air Attack placed an order for two airtankers and a lead plane for retardant drops with ABC. ABC informed Air Attack that a Type 1 Helicopter was ordered and would be responding within the hour. Air Attack advised ABC to hold the air tanker order because he felt the Type 1 Helicopter would be more effective to provide better support for ground resources. In addition, this would not conflict in the air space. Approximately 30 minutes after this conversation, ABC informed Air Attack that the Type 1 Helicopter was not enroute (due to standard start up process and safety checks). Air Attack immediately advised ABC to reorder the previously requested air tankers and lead plane.

At about the same time, ABC informs BC34 that four Type 6 engines and one Interagency Hotshot Crew are enroute. Pueblo of Isleta employees on scene work to establish an anchor point at the heel of the fire using a road. Within one hour of the fire being reported, BC34 arrived on scene and took command of the fire. Once on scene BC34 ordered an Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3) and additional resources including interagency hotshot crews, engines, dozers and a Very Large Airtanker. He continued to try and establish an anchor point at the heel of the fire so arriving resources could begin flanking the fire toward the east on both the north and south flanks. Fire behavior was intense in the heavy slash and forced ground resources to back out to a safe area until conditions moderated.



Figure 2 - Dog Head Fire at approximately 1305 on June 14, 2016

Aerial retardant was utilized on the heel to cool the fire so ground crews could safely engage and establish an anchor point. By this time an IHC and two engines were on scene and instructed to establish an anchor point and begin flanking the fire. Aerial resources continued to extend retardant lines around the fire in an attempt to slow fire spread for the remainder of the day to support ongoing line construction activities by hand crews. Additional resources continued to arrive throughout the afternoon and included the fully qualified ICT3, an additional IHC, a dozer, and engines. BC34 transitioned to the ICT3 trainee. Due to increasing complexity, the ICT3 and ICT3(t) placed an order for the Zone Type 3 Incident Management Team (IMT).

At around this same time the Acting Cibola Fire Staff Officer and Forest Supervisor/Agency Administrator contacted the Mountainair District Ranger and Mountainair District Fire Management Officer (DFMO) to discuss concerns with increasing complexity. Before completing the analysis it was agreed that complexity had increased given the fire intensity and values at risk it was agreed to order a Southwest Area (SWA) Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT). The complexity analysis was completed shortly thereafter by the District Ranger and the DFMO.

Regional demand for air tankers was high due to other fires in Arizona, but air resources were diverted from other fires to the Dog Head Fire. Retardant aircraft was heavily utilized throughout the afternoon and into the early evening to establish an anchor point from which ground resources could safely begin suppression activities. At the end of the day, retardant lines were in place around the fire perimeter and over 100,000 gallons of retardant had been applied by one Very Large Airtanker (VLAT), 2 Large Airtankers, 6 Single Engine Airtankers (SEATs).

By the time that Air Attack reached the end of his shift the fire was estimated at approximately 800 acres and cooling. Ground resources continued to flank the fire, as direct as possible, through the night using road systems, dozer line, and hand line. Although there were spot fires and mechanical issues with the heavy equipment on the ground, good progress was made overnight, especially on the south flank.

On the morning of June 15, the fire appeared to be relatively cool. Infrared mapping showed the fire size was 682 acres. Day shift resources picked up flanking efforts from the night shift and continued toward the east. Aerial resources continued to drop retardant and water to support ground resources throughout the morning.

At 0800 that morning, the Cibola, NM State Forestry and Bureau of Indian Affairs Agency Administrator's in-briefed the assigned SWA Type 2 IMT. The transfer of command with the IMT3 was scheduled for 1800 that evening.

At approximately 1115 a spot fire was observed approximately 1 to 1 ½ miles northeast of the main fire. Aerial and ground resources were diverted to address the spot fire. At approximately 1300 hours fire intensity and behavior increased and pushed the main fire toward the spot fire. Conditions were unsafe and resources working the spot fire pulled out and returned to support flanking actions on the main fire. The spot fire was engulfed by the main fire shortly thereafter.



Figure 3 - Dog Head Fire at approximately 1154 hours on June 15, 2016

The fire was rapidly moving toward the Chilili Community. At 1340 the ICT3(t) recommended to jurisdictional authorities that the area be evacuated. Albuquerque Metro Area Rapid Response Mutual Aid Taskforce resources were requested by the Type 2 IMT through Bernalillo County Fire Department. These resources arrived within one hour and were plugged in with incident resources already providing structure protection within the Chilili area. A community meeting was held in Torreon to update the public on the fire and inform them of fire status and evacuation situation.

Transfer of Command to the Southwest Area (SWA) Type 2 IMT occurred at 1800 hours. The fire was actively burning toward structures in the Chilili community. Mutual aid resources from local county and city agencies were arriving on scene, and were placed in staging due to communication issues. These resources were mobilized from staging, to specific areas in need, tying directly in with IMT resources who had positive communication; allowing for accountability of the resources. Ground resources engaged the fire where conditions allowed them to safely do so; but fire intensity precluded action on the head of the fire. At 2130, the fire was 5,077 acres

The fire burned actively into the night. Wind gusts out of the southwest up to 30 mph and slope alignment resulted in extreme fire behavior. Running crown fires occurred, and the fire made a six mile push towards Chilili. Flame lengths of 100 feet were observed. Fire conditions began to subside at approximately 0100 hours on June 16, (day 3 of the fire). At 0400 resources attempted to access the Aceves area, where structures were known to exist, to attempt to save and/or prevent further damage; however they encountered downed power lines and had to retreat until it could be confirmed that all power was shut off. Resources continued to assist in evacuation and provide structure protection in the Chilili and Escabosa areas. During this run, the final assessment concluded that the fire consumed 12 residences and 44 other structures.

At approximately 0900 on June 16, the Cibola, NM State Forestry and Bureau of Indian Affairs Agency Administrators and the Type 2 IMT IC had a conference call to discuss the fire. The IC recommended completing a new complexity analysis. He had concerns about the increasing complexity due additional incoming resources from the Risk Management Program as a result of the Governor's Disaster Declaration which would exceed his span of control. In addition, due to the significant increase in the fire size overnight, spotting potential with a forecasted southerly wind, and immediate threats to several communities (including Ponderosa Estates which contained well over 1,000 homes) and concerns about unexploded ordinances within the Kirtland Air Force Base military withdrawal area.

A new complexity analysis was completed at approximately 1200 which indicated the need for a Type 1 IMT. Although the Type 2 IMT was making good progress, due to the substantial increase in the number of needed and assigned suppression resources, the threats to more values at risk, and due to the social and political interest, the Cibola, NM State Forestry, and BIA Agency Administrators all agreed the complexity had indeed increased and the decision was made to order a Type 1 IMT.

Day activities focused on providing point protection for structures, holding established fire lines, and securing the flanks of the fire. Night activities focused on continuing to construct control lines on the east and south flanks under more favorable conditions. Significant fire spread occurred this day. By the morning of June 17th the fire had was 16,752 acres.

Throughout June 17th and 18th day and night operations, minimal fire growth occurred primarily along the west flank and fingers to the southeast. SWA Type 1 IMT assumed command of the incident at 0600 hours on June 19. The Type 1 IMT continued suppression actions initiated by the Type 2 IMT and by June 21 fire growth was stopped at 17,912 acres.

The Type 1 IMT transitioned back to the Zone Type 3 IMT at 0600 on Saturday June 25. At transfer of command, the fire had burned 17,912 acres and was 90 percent contained. The Type 3 IMT transfers command to the Mountainair Ranger District on June 30th. The fire was declared 100 percent contained on July 13 (line is constructed, mop-up is ongoing, and the spread is stopped). On August 10th the fire was 100 percent controlled (control lines are completed around the fire, any spot fires, and any interior islands to be saved; any unburned area adjacent to the fire side of the control lines are burned out; and all hot spots that are immediate threats to the control line are cooled down, until the lines can reasonably be expected to hold under the foreseeable conditions). The fire was declared 100 percent out on September 12 with a final size of 17,912 acres. Refer to Appendix A for a final map of the fire.

Rehabilitation Efforts

The cooperating agencies and numerous partners have been critical to support of suppression efforts,

community meetings, and ongoing rehabilitation and restoration work. They attended all briefings from the beginning and numerous meetings have been essential partners and resources to landowners and affected communities with these efforts.

Within the first week, the Forest Service convened a Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) Team to assess immediate rehabilitation needs on National Forest System lands to prevent downstream flooding and further impacts to landowners. BAER is an emergency stabilization program intended to minimize threats to life or property and prevent unacceptable degradation to natural and cultural resources.

A coordinated interagency and partner response across “all lands” was initiated on June 21 to address recovery of the land and people in the impacted communities. The Cibola worked with state and federal senators and representatives, NRCS, Farm Services Agency, NM Department of Homeland Security, NM State Forestry, NM Environment Department, Army Corp of Engineers, East Tarrance, Edgewood, and Claunch-Pinto SWCDs, Pueblo of Isleta, Bernalillo and Tarrance Counties, and others to jointly assess the needs on federal and private lands, develop funding requests, and provide resources to affected landowners and the Chili community.

The majority of the fire (10,773 acres) burned on the Chilili Land Grant. Approximately 6,600 acres occurred on the Forest, and 436 acres on private. The Pueblo of Isleta, State of New Mexico, and Bureau of Land Management combined had less than 100 acres.

Fire effects varied throughout the burn area. Severity mapping of burned soils indicated that approximately 50 percent of the affected NFS lands burned at a moderate intensity, 25 percent burned high, and 25 percent burned low or was unchanged. Approximately 17 percent of the private lands, including the Chilili Land Grant, burned at high intensity, with 46 percent moderate, 22 percent low, and 16 percent unburned.

The time-critical stabilization work on the Cibola was planned and completed within a month (by July 22). This included repairs to Forest Service Roads 321 and 260 to improve storm run-off, cleaning culverts, pumping the toilet at Tajique Campground to avoid waste overflow, and stabilizing archeological sites with seeding and mulching.

Other immediate actions occurring on the Cibola that were not specifically part of the BAER efforts included installing rain gauges as early warning devices and hazard tree removal to reduce the risk of falling snags. Storm patrols, construction and installation of warning signs about hazards from the fire, and invasive species surveys are still ongoing.

Seeding to mitigate soil loss on high severity burn areas was considered but several factors made it unwarranted. The burned area largely consists of gentle to moderate slopes in Pinyon Juniper woodlands. Soil modeling indicated that emergency soil stabilization was not necessary since the predicted soil loss is expected to be within accepted tolerances for the majority of the burn scar. In addition, aerial seeding in dry, low elevation, south facing slopes has been shown to have a low success rate in the Southwest on other post-fire efforts.

While BAER addresses imminent threats to values at risk, it does not address longer-term rehabilitation, which may take several years. We are currently developing a plan for long-term rehabilitation needs. This includes securing funding for fence replacement, snag removal along fence lines, boundary surveys, and restoration of grazing allotments.

Special Emergency Wildfire Suppression funding is used to pay for BAER activities. To date, the total cost for emergency rehabilitation efforts on the Forest has been \$210,589. Assessments of the Chilili Land Grant and private lands was performed by the Dog Head Fire Coordinated Rehabilitating Group and cooperating agencies. They are providing alarms, flood control, well testing, landowner assistance

and clean-up of home sites, and other activities. The cost of emergency response efforts on other lands has not yet been determined. Total long-term needs and costs are still being developed.

Key Lessons Learned and Adaptive Management

The following summarizes key lessons learned and adaptations from reviews of the cause of the fire, response to the fire, and rehabilitation efforts.

Cause and Origin

The Forest uses the process outlined in the Southwest Interagency Fire Restrictions and Closure Master Operating Plan and the Cibola NF and NG Fire Danger Operating Plan to make determinations regarding fire restrictions. We have reviewed this process and plan to continue to use it. In the future, we may look at site specific conditions to take additional steps to mitigate and reduce the potential for fire, depending on the conditions. For example, we would look at this when moving equipment to another area.

Preliminary assessments after the fire indicate approximately 80 percent of the Isleta Project remains unburned. Modifications to the operations and agreement are underway to cut, skid and move materials to a deck along the roads rather than leave downed logs in the woods to make it easier for local communities to retrieve this material for firewood. These changes were in consideration before the fire and will be implemented on the remaining project area. This is intended to reduce fuel loadings in the woods before operations resume again.

Initial reviews also indicate the thinning operations on the Cibola and in the surrounding private lands helped moderate the effects of the fire. The Cibola is participating in a collaborative effort with other cooperators and partners to develop a complete assessment and capture lessons learned.

Response to the Fire

Several challenges and key lessons learned were noted during the duration primarily related to communications, medical needs, evacuation procedure, and significant local/political interests.

In response to inadequate radio/cell coverage, efforts to have face-to-face contacts with fire responders and cooperators became essential. Positive, professional, meaningful and regular briefings and interactions with cooperators and stakeholders was necessary to gain the trust and relationships necessary for successful response efforts. Providing better standard operating procedures and continually improving the dialogue and communication through early engagement ensured a seamless operational transitions between teams and resources on the ground. Future efforts should ensure that mutual aid resources have programmable radios and come with adequate overhead to maintain command and control. Pre-season work to establish land use agreements ahead of time would enable a quicker response for the teams to establish staging areas as well as incident command posts.

Good relationships among partners and cooperating agencies and discussions in community meetings about risk management and life first principles in pre-season efforts and during the incident garnered a shared understanding of the incident strategy and objectives. Medical issues that arose throughout the incident highlighted the need for procedural clarity within the IMT. The IMT rapidly instituted scenarios and drills to provide opportunities to practice and improve efficiencies. Periodic drills should be used on

future incidents. The work associated with setting up a contract to procure the services of a local doctor was well worth the peace of mind and efficiency gained regarding the proper care of injured firefighters.

Road closures and evacuation procedures were confusing between counties jurisdictions that split the fire. As a result private citizens did not evacuate during mandatory periods resulting in safety concerns for both incident personnel and private citizens. Daily discussions between the team liaisons, operations, utility companies, sheriff offices, and cooperators was instrumental in improving communications which included posting of maps on social media, and reviewing specific locations at daily community meetings. The result was a much higher understanding of the risks involved; and safe and orderly re-entry of evacuated residents.


Rehabilitation Efforts

The rehabilitation team efforts are ongoing and a lessons learned effort has not yet been convened. Some challenges have occurred related to lack of understanding of each other's agencies jurisdictions, roles, authorities, or needs and timelines for requesting resources. Frequent meetings early on have proved essential to coordinating efforts. Several coordination meetings have occurred to provide information to landowners and affected community members.

List of Appendices

- A. Dog Head Fire Map
- B. Values at Risk
- C. Timeline of Significant Events

D. Appendix A – Dog Head Fire Map



Appendix B – Values at Risk

The Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) document created for the Dog Head Fire (June 16 at 1229 hours) identified the following Values at Risk:

- Chilili, Tajiue, Pueblo of Isleta, and Tijeras Pueblo Lands
- Isolated communities to the north of Sandia Road
- Critical Infrastructure Resources
 - Chilili and Pueblo of Isleta Powerlines near structures/homes
 - Communication Lines
 - Underground pipeline
- Community structures near Chilili Range boundary fence
 - 8 miles/6 archaeological sites (risk from suppression possible on Pueblo of Isleta, Tajiue, and Chilili lands)
- Wildlife habitat/wildlife preserves – Endangered species habitat
 - Goshawk FPA
 - Mexican Spotted Owl habitat
- Upper Dog Head and David Canyon water resources on Chilili and Tajiue Land Grant
 - Tajiue Creek
 - Manzano Spring and Lake
- Recreation trails and developed campgrounds
 - Fourth of July Campground
 - Inlow Youth Camp
 - SUFI Camp
- Capilla Lookout
- Areas of tribal significance

The course of action selected for the Dog Head Fire was for a direct suppression strategy using Life First Principles with firefighter and public safety being the top priority.

Appendix C – Timeline of Significant Events

Tuesday - June 14, 2016

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
1122	Pueblo of Isleta, Division of Natural Resources (DNR) Zulu 11 contacted DNR Base station about the fire.
1124	DNR Zulu 1 contacted Mountainair District Fire Management Officer via telephone to inform him of the fire.
1130	Albuquerque Interagency Dispatch Center (ABC) received the initial report of the fire from Capilla Lookout and initiated Dog Head Wildfire entry NM-CIF-2016-277 entry in WildCAD (1133). Shortly thereafter Pueblo of Isleta employee (Zulu 11) radioed ABC that they were on scene and provided coordinates of fire.
1138	Battalion Chief 34 (BC34), and two Type 6 engines (Mountainair Engine 642 with chase vehicle, and Helena Engine 623), and Air Attack 775 DM were dispatched to the incident. Capilla Lookout advises the fire has doubled in size and color is dark black.
1144-1146	Mountainair District Duty Officer advises Pueblo of Isleta employee (Zulu 11) on scene to take action on fire. Duty Officer requests aircraft 775DM to take recon of fire. Capilla Lookout advises ABC that fuels in the area of the fire are heavy slash.
1155	Southern Pueblo Agency (SPA) advises ABC that fire is approximately ¼ mile from Pueblo of Isleta and will be sending engines E-2061 and E-2062.
1158	A Type 1 Helicopter and Type 3 CWN Helicopter are ordered (from ABC to SWCC)
1207	Capilla Lookout advises that smoke color has changed to dark black smoke. Order for Type 1 and Type 3 Helicopters were faxed over to 8CH and 718MH from ABC.
1212-1217	775DM notifies ABC that BC 34 and Zulu 11 are requesting two Air Tankers and one Lead Plane. Lead Plane came from Phoenix. ABC advises 775DM that a Type 1 Helicopter will be taking off within 25 minutes. 775DM tells ABC to hold air tankers because arrival of Type 1 Helicopter will buy time and be more effective. Reasoning to hold air tankers is because of air space deconfliction. Fire is approximately 2-3 acres.
1221	BC34 requests two additional Type 6 Engines. ABC informs BC34 that four Type 6 engines and one Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC) are enroute. Pueblo of Isleta resource (Zulu 5) informs ABC that they will be in command until Forest Service resources arrive on scene. Zulu 5 continues to primarily work on the northern flank of the fire with the other Pueblo of Isleta resources already on site.
1227	775DM is advised by ABC that the Type 1 helicopter was an hour out. <i>(It takes about 1 hour for the pilot to go through all the safety checks for start-up. Additionally, the bucket was placed internally for transport, so the crew had to reattach the bucket).</i> 775DM advises ABC to reorder the airtankers on hold due to wind causing spot fires.

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
1230	BC34 arrives on site and orders an additional IHC and an Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3). BC34 develops strategy to establish anchor point at heel of fire with retardant so ground resources could begin flanking the main fire. Pueblo of Isleta resources were engaged on the northern flank but did not get an opportunity (due to communication issues) to coordinate tactics. Additional resources were ordered including IHCs, engines, and dozers.
1300	Very Large Air Tanker (VLAT) ordered.
1314	BC 34 requests ABC to order the Zone Type 3 IMT.
1406	Midewin IHC arrives on scene and gets assignment from IC. They are given the task of working up the western flank, heading up toward the north end of the fire (Division Alpha)
1416	Engine 641 and chase vehicle arrive on scene and immediately established a staging area for resources to report to prior to engaging on the fire.
1423	Air Attack estimates acreage at 70 acres.
1430	In discussions of the increasing complexity with the Mountainair District Ranger, Mountainair District Fire Management Officer, and Acting Cibola Fire Staff Officer, a decision to order a Type 2 IMT was made by the Forest Supervisor. The Zone Type 3 IMT mobilized on 06/14 to support existing fire organization until Type 2 IMT arrived the next day (06/15).
1455	718MH Type 3 CWN Helicopter arrives on scene and makes contact with AA.
1500	(Lead Plane requested relieve) SWCC informs ABC that there are no available Bravo/Lead aircraft available to relieve Lead Plane and will not be able to launch VLAT or T-131 because they can't respond without a lead plane/ASM oversight. ABC relays information to 775DM over the fire.
1537	775DM requests 4 additional air tankers.
1540	ICT3 arrives on scene and ties in with BC34. BC34 becomes ICT3 (trainee). They develop a plan to establish an anchor point on the hill utilizing road system. Fire is divided into two divisions, Alpha on the north flank and Zulu on the south flank. Fire was well established in heavy slash. Due to active fire behavior, lack of safety zones, and no anchor point ground resources were pulled off main fire. SPA 5 observes spot fires found on Pueblo of Isleta. The spot fires are being worked with retardant. An additional SPA engine is requested to support. SPA dispatches E-2043.
1545-2015	Retardant aircraft <u>heavily</u> utilized throughout the afternoon and into the early evening to establish an anchor point from which ground resources could safely begin suppression activities. At the end of the day, retardant was around the fire perimeter. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only Air Tanker in NM was 911 in Roswell, all others were in AZ • Regional activity was high (Cedar, Wildcat) • Air Tankers were diverted from other fires to Dog Head • 6/14 = 1 VLAT, 2 Large AT, 6 SEATs for 107,147 gals delivered
2026	ICT3 (t) and 775DM provide an update to ABC. Retardant lines are in place around the fire. Ground resources have anchored at the heel and are working both the north and south flanks. The plan for the night was to utilize Midewin IHC and a dozer on the

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
	north flank (Division Alpha) and Gila IHC, a dozer, and an engine on the south flank (Division Zulu). Resources not needed for the planned night operation will be sent to Estancia High School at 2100 to bed down for the night. Fire estimated to be approximately 800 acres in size. A Division/Group Supervisor (DIVS) also assigned to remain on fire for the night.
2129	SPA 5 provides update to ABC for spot fires on Pueblo of Isleta (which are in Division A). Hand lines and dozer lines are holding on pueblo lands. Resources include SPA 5, E-2062, E-2043, Chase 1, and Pueblo of Isleta DNR (5 people). No additional resources needed for the night and they will remain on scene until relieved in the morning.
2356	ABC informed that DIVS, Midewin IHC, E-623, and E-62 will bed down on fire at 2400. Gila IHC will continue to work through the night.

Wednesday - June 15, 2016

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
0245	Infrared flight flown indicates fire is 682 acres.
0800	SWA Type 2 IMT team is in-briefed by Cibola, NM State Forestry and BIA at Supervisor's Office in Albuquerque. The transfer of command with the IMT3 was scheduled for 1800 that evening.
0812	<p>Morning briefing conducted and resources enroute to fire to begin operations. The fire was broken into two Divisions, Alpha and Zulu, and included a Structural Protection Group.</p> <p>Division Alpha had a DIVS and DIVS (t), 2 IHCs, 1 Type 2IA crew, 1 crew module of 5, 3 Type 6 Engines, and 1 Type 2 Dozer assigned. Instruction for resources on Division Alpha are to continue to flank the north edge of the fire progressing to the east and north to reduce threat to structures northwest of the fire and to utilize air resources as necessary.</p> <p>Division Zulu had a DIVS, 3 Type 6 Engines, and an EMT Basic assigned. Instructions for resources on Division Zulu are to continue to flank the south edge of the fire progressing to the east and north and utilize air resources as necessary.</p> <p>The Structural Protection group had a DIVS assigned and was tasked to assess, identify, and begin preparation of structures north and east of the fire.</p>
0936	Air Attack requests 3 Heavy Air Tankers, 1 Very Large Air Tanker, 5 Single Engine Air Tankers, and a lead plane.
1115	A spot fire, approximately 1 to 1.5 miles northeast of main fire, was spotted. Aerial and ground resources are diverted to address the spot fire.
1300	Fire behavior noticeably picks up in intensity. Resources working the spot fire are forced to disengage due to main fire rapidly spreading toward their location.

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
	Operational resources from IMT2 are engaged in shadowing of current operations personnel and area familiarization of fire in preparation for assumption of command.
1340	ICT3 (t) and Structure Protection DIVS recommends evacuations for the Aceves residential area.
1343	Very Large Air Tanker diverted to higher priority incident in Arizona. (Cedar)
1348	ICT3 (t) reports that fire has crossed FS Road 321 and is moving north/northeast. Fire has also crossed FS Road 260 and is on the pipeline road.
1605	The Albuquerque Metro Area Rapid Response Mutual Aid Taskforce, a mixture of 13 Type I, II, III VI, Engines from the Albuquerque Metro Area and 2 qualified overhead, were requested respond to Chilili to provide structure protection. Requested resources were requested by the Type 2 IMT through Bernalillo County FD. These resources arrived within 1 hour and were plugged in with incident resources already providing structure protection within the Chilili area.
1625	Fire estimated to be approximately 1/3 to 1/2 mile from structures along Aceves Road.
1715	ICT3(t) and Structure Protection DIVS confirm evacuation of public and home owners in the Aceves area, recommended at 1340, was complete.
1800	Transfer of Command to SWA Type 2 IMT occurred at 1800. Night shift resources (OSC, DIVS, 4 engines, an IHC, and 1 EMT) were briefed. Primary objective was to maintain LCES while assessing fire activity and engaging where fire conditions allowed.
1800	Community meeting conducted in Torreon. Torrance County Emergency Manager clarified that the evacuation notice was no longer voluntary but now mandatory. Mandatory Evacuation of area south of 217 and 337 roads issued. Law Enforcement personnel begin evacuation.
2030-2100	Fire activity increases. Mutual aid resources from local county and city agencies begin to arrive. Communication with these resources was a challenge. Maintaining accountability of location of all resources was a priority. Primary objective was to ensure that evacuation was complete and to save structures if possible in the Aceves, Chilili, and Escabosa area.
2132	Infrared Flight indicates fire is 5,077 acres.
2130-2230	Fire is burning actively and makes a six mile push toward Chilili. Traffic on 337 Road shut down and burnout initiated.
NOTE:	Confirmation by Torrance County on June 25 of 12 residences and 44 other structure were burned on the evening of June 15 after 2120 hours.

Thursday - June 16, 2016

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
0100-0700	Fire activity begins to subside at around 0100 and at 0400 resources begin to assess structures to see if anything can be done to save them. Downed powerlines are encountered. Seeing these down powerlines at night in smoky conditions proves to be very difficult. Resources were removed until it was confirmed that all power was shut off.

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
0600-1800	Day shift activities were primarily focused on providing point protection to structures and continuing to hold established line and secure the flanks of the fire.
0900-1200	Agency Administrators' briefing with Type 2 IC, discussed increasing complexity and outlook for strong runs to the north. Updated complexity analysis, ordered Type 1 IMT.
1800-2400	Night shift activities focused on continuing to construct control line under more favorable conditions on the east and south flanks.

June 17 – September 21, 2016

TIME	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
June 17	Infrared flight flown indicates fire is 17,615 acres.
June 19	SWA Type 1 IMT assumes command, continues suppression actions initiated by the Type 2 IMT.
June 21	Fire growth was stopped at 17,912 acres
June 25	Zone Type 3 IMT assumes command. Continues suppression and mop up operations. Size is 17,912 acres and 90% contained.
June 30	Zone Type 3 IMT transfers command to local unit, Mountainair Ranger District.
July 13	Fire is declared 100% contained. Containment means a line is constructed, mop up is ongoing, and the spread of the fire is stopped. Size is 17,912 acres.
August 10	Fire is declared 100% controlled. Control lines are completed around the fire, any spot fires, and any interior islands to be saved; any unburned area adjacent to the fire side of the control lines are burned out; and all hot spots that are immediate threats to the control line are cooled down, until the lines can reasonably be expected to hold under the foreseeable conditions. Size remains 17,912 acres.
Sept. 12	Fire is declared 100% out in WFDDS.